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Abstract 
 
This paper presents theory and evidence to show that imperialism was a major factor imped-
ing the spread of the industrial revolution during the century ending in the 1950s. Two em-
pirical results stand out. First, analysis of historical evidence shows that most sovereign coun-
tries were implementing active industrial policies during the nineteenth century, while policies 
in dependent countries were biased in the opposite direction. Second, when allowance is made 
for economic determinants, industrialization in dependent countries in 1960 is found to be 
significantly lower than in sovereign countries. This result is shown to be quite robust to 
changes in data, sample size, functional forms, and specifications of the estimating equations. 
In particular, the basic results are not affected by the inclusion of a dummy for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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1. Introduction1 
The limited diffusion of the industrial revolution across the globe constitutes one of the cen-
tral economic problems of our epoch. It is also a conundrum for the social sciences. 
Although world manufacturing output increased 24-fold between 1750 and 1953, this 
growth was concentrated in a small number of developed countries. In 1953, less than a tenth 
of the world's population in the developed countries accounted for 57 percent of world man-
ufacturing output. At the other end, developing countries containing some two-thirds of the 
world's population, contributed a mere six to seven percent of this output. The per capita gap in 
manufacturing output between developed and developing countries in 1953 was of the order 
of 27 to 1. Although this gap has narrowed since then, it was still 20 to 1 in 1980.2 
At least three sets of explanations for the unequal spread of industrialization have been 
proposed. For a long time, it was maintained that barriers to the spread of industrialization 
were cultural. Some societies simply did not possess those attitudes to work, savings, risk-
taking or cooperation which are necessary for the efficient operation of markets and modern 
industries. Since the 1950s, the emphasis has shifted to economic obstacles, including nar-
row markets, poor infrastructure, weak financial institutions, falling terms of trade, and rap-
id population growth. A third set of radical theories seeks to explain backwardness as the 
result of disequalizing tendencies emanating from world capitalism.3 
This paper proposes an approach which has affinity with radical theories, but qualifies 
them in important ways. It accepts the neo-Marxist premise about disequalizing effects of 
world capitalism, but argues that these effects are not the same across all lagging countries, nor 
are they constant over time.4 
                                                          
1  I wish to thank Professors John Adams, Christopher Clague, Keith Griffin, D. Gale Johnson, Da-
vid M. Landes and Robert M. Solow for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. All 
remaining inadequacies in the paper are still my own. 
2  Bairoch (1982: 275, 303 and 307). 
3  Boeke (1953) was a leading exponent of the cultural approach during the 1950s; more recently, it 
has been revived by Clark (1987). The most complete recent statement of how the small size of 
markets can become obstacles to industrialization may be found in Lewis (1977). For a review of 
the radical theories, see Griffin and Gurley (1985). 
4  Countries are defined as lagging or advanced in relation to their stage of capitalist development.  
The stage of capitalist development is evaluated in terms of the development of a country's capital 
and labor markets and the relative power of manufacturing capital. 
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The disequalizing effects of world capitalism in any lagging country depends on the degree 
to which its political autonomy has been circumscribed by advanced countries. Thus, it is 
not enough to study the action of market forces on the manner in which lagging countries are 
integrated into world markets: the impact of imperialism—of unequal power relations among 
countries—must also be incorporated into our analysis. Following this logic, we propose to ex-
amine the links between imperialism and the uneven spread of industrialization over the century 
ending in the 1950s. 
These links are explored at three different levels. At the theoretical level, imperialism is 
shown to generate several powerful effects that are inimical to industrialization in lagging coun-
tries.5 Some historical evidence is then marshaled, drawing attention to a direct relation be-
tween policies supportive of industrialization and the degree of political independence en-
joyed by a lagging country. These discussions suggest an important testable proposition: they 
lead us to expect that the cumulative effects of imperialist policies reduced the output and em-
ployment shares of manufacturing in dependent countries below those in sovereign countries, 
ceteris paribus. Empirical tests for 1960, the earliest year for which data becomes available for a 
large number of lagging countries, bear out this expectation. A concluding section presents a 
summary of the results and some thoughts on the significance of these results. 
2. Imperialism and Industrialization: Theory 
Neo-Marxists often maintain that economic backwardness results from the integration of lag-
ging countries into the economies of advanced countries. The political forms under which this 
integration occurs are not deemed important and, hence, receive little attention.6 Because of 
this neglect, neo-Marxists cannot adequately explain the significant disparities in levels of de-
velopment across lagging countries. 
Historically, Latin America has been more integrated into the world economy than In-
dia, China, Thailand, Egypt, Iran or Turkey, whether we examine this integration in terms of 
commodity or capital flows.7 This would suggest, a la many neo-Marxists, greater economic 
development and industrialization in the latter regions. Yet Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
                                                          
5  This section borrows from the analysis of the economic impact of imperialism in Alam (1994). 
6  See Palma (1978) for a review of this literature. 
7  Kenwood and Lougheed (1971: 40-43) and O'Connor (1970: 133). 
  
 
4 
enjoyed substantially higher levels of economic development and industrialization during the 
first half of this century than any of the latter countries. This suggests that integration per se 
was not the problem. Why, then, did integration work for some countries and not for others? 
It is our thesis that integration worked better for countries with greater domestic control over 
their social and economic policies. 
Alam (1994: 236-8) has shown how capital, labor and governments in advanced countries 
use coercive means to pursue their economic goals in lagging countries. Over the century and a 
half ending in the 1950s, these goals may be examined under three heads: trade-creation, aimed at 
converting lagging countries to primary production; factor-deployment, seeking to create and mo-
nopolize investment and employment opportunities in lagging countries; and rent-capture, or 
appropriation of existing and new forms of rents in lagging countries. Success in pursuing 
these goals depended on the degree of imperialist control exercised over social and economic 
policies of lagging countries. Industrialization is expected to be weakest in the colonies, gaining 
ground as we move to quasi-colonies, dependencies and sovereign countries.8 
The industrial revolution in Britain, a la Lewis (1977: 7), offered two options to the rest 
of the world: they could imitate Britain's example, or trade their primary products for Britain's 
manufactures. The first option was available only to countries that were free to promote and 
protect their manufacturing sectors. Most countries in Asia and Africa had this ability taken 
away-they became colonies, quasi-colonies or dependencies – before they could exercise this 
choice.9 In the event, they took the latter route and proceeded to trade their primary exports 
against manufactures from advanced countries. 
Of course, there were sovereign countries, mostly in South America, which chose-
because this served their dominant landed interests-to convert to primary production, but 
their primary orientation was rarely pushed quite as far as in the dependent countries: defined 
here to include colonies, quasi-colonies and dependencies. There were at least three reasons 
                                                          
8  Colonies are countries with governments run by expatriates. Quasi-colonies have indigenous gov-
ernments with policy autonomy limited by forced treaties. Dependencies have indigenous gov-
ernments whose policy autonomy is constrained by the dominance of foreign factors and/or for-
eign powers. Sovereign countries have indigenous governments that are generally free from exter-
nally imposed constraints. 
9  One sovereign lagging country, Egypt, which had made substantial investments in modern manu-
facturing-some$1-2 million by 1838-was forced to dismantle its industries following defeat by the 
British and French in 1840. See Issawi (1961: 5). 
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for this. Instead of imposing direct taxes on their own incomes, the land-owning elites in the 
sovereign countries preferred to raise revenues by taxing imports, thereby offering substan-
tial levels of protection to many of their manufactures. Some manufacturing active ties were 
preserved for security reasons. Others managed to survive by virtue of their social ties to 
the ruling elites. Clearly, these mitigating factors were either missing or operated weakly in 
most dependent countries. 
Conversion to primary production per se need not have led to a dead end. Sustained 
growth in the primary sector can raise incomes, creating new infrastructure, a middle class, 
and putting in place a network of international contacts: changes which can gradually shift a 
lagging country's comparative advantage and the balance of its social forces towards manufac-
turing activities. At some point in this transformation, reindustrialization can begin via import 
substitution or the processing of raw materials for export, and, once underway, this transfor-
mation can be stimulated by supportive government policies. 
Historical record shows, however, that such induced industrialization-stimulated by growth 
of the primary sector-was confined to sovereign countries. In contrast, most dependent lag-
ging countries which traveled the same route, had only tiny fractions of their labor force in 
modern manufacturing even as late as the 1950s. This failure of dependent countries to make 
the transition from primary production to manufactures is due in large measure to a combina-
tion of slow growth and income leakages, consequences which flowed from their dependent 
status. The causal mechanisms which produced these results require some clarification. 
Economic growth in dependent countries was stymied primarily through policies affecting 
their subsistence sector, in most cases the dominant sector in their economies. Colonial 
powers cemented their control over dependent countries through alliances with tribal leaders 
and the largest land-owners, while displacing indigenous traders, bankers, manufacturers and 
officials from their activities. These alliances generally worked against progressive actions-
relating to production technologies, land tenure, banking, local government, education, exten-
sion services, and the status of women—which might generate economic growth but also 
threatened to reduce the political and economic control of the landed elites over the peas-
antry. There were also strong economic forces pitted against the subsistence sector. Impe-
rialist policies often resulted in the dominance of foreign capital in the exchange sectors of 
dependent countries. Since unskilled wages paid by foreign capital were linked to labor prod-
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uctivity in food, this promoted a studied neglect of food productivity in the colonies, a policy 
which also depressed the terms of trade for primary products.10 Although there is evidence of 
government support for technical change in raw materials in the colonies, government interest 
in promoting food productivity was uncommon.11 
Imperialist policies in dependent countries also worked to concentrate gains from export 
growth in the hands of foreign factors.12 Incomes accruing to foreign factors were mostly re-
patriated; another part was spent on luxury imports.13 In either case, the concentration of in-
come gains in the hands of foreign factors led to large income leakages from dependent coun-
tries. These leakages, together with the low real incomes caused by adverse primary terms of 
trade, limited the growth of mass markets for simple consumer non-durables in the dependent 
countries, thereby weakening the incentives for industrialization via import substitution. 
These adverse influences notwithstanding, over time, a growing number of dependent 
countries came to possess markets that were sufficiently large to permit import substitution 
in at least the basic consumer goods. By the end of the 1920s, this stage had been reached in 
most lagging countries, including some countries in Sub-Saharan African.14 The governments 
in dependent countries did very little to capture these markets for their own industries; perhaps 
worse, in some cases official policies directly obstructed such import substitution activities. On 
the contrary, sovereign countries that chose primary production were led by degrees towards 
policies that were increasingly supportive of industrialization. These differences in policies to-
wards induced industrialization are directly traceable to a simple yet fundamental differ-
ence in the politics of sovereign and dependent primary-producing countries. Economic poli-
cies in sovereign countries were formulated by domestic land-owning elites; in the dependent 
countries this role was played by foreign capital. 
                                                          
10  Lewis (1977). 
11  Yudelman (1975). 
12  The policies in question included official discrimination against domestic entrepreneurs vis-a-vis 
entry into trade, industry, and mining; land grants to foreign companies at throw-away prices; pre-
ferential employment of expatriates; etc. For evidence on the percentage of national income re-
ceived by whites in Belgian Congo, see Peemans (1975:181); for similar evidence on Indonesia, see 
Maddison (1990: 361-63). 
13  The repatriation of incomes by foreign factors created persistent and, often, large surpluses in the 
trade accounts of several dependent countries. For evidence on trade surpluses in Indonesia, see 
Maddison (1990:366). Golay (1976: 375-376) suggests that somewhat more than half of the export 
surpluses of several Southeast Asian countries financed net outflows of interest and dividends. 
14  Brett (1973: 267). 
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A policy of free trade in manufactures is not nearly as vital to domestic land-owning elites in 
sovereign countries as it is to foreign capital in dependent countries. Protection of manufacturing 
can hurt the landed elites by lowering their export earnings, taxing their consumption of luxury 
imports, and increasing un-skilled wages because of a rise in the cost of wage goods and diversion 
of labor to manufacturing. In the long run, it may cause worries about sharing power with a nas-
cent industrial bourgeoisie. But there also exist some important offsetting gains from industrializa-
tion. An industrial sector can create domestic demand for primary products, thereby offsetting to 
some degree fluctuations in export earnings. Industrialization can also create demand for new 
primary products which can be supplied domestically. Perhaps most importantly, the more enter-
prising members of the landed elites will diversify into industrial activities, thereby weakening the 
opposition of this class to industrialization. 
On the other hand, a policy of protectionism would strike at the very roots of foreign capital, 
whether it dominates the trade of dependent countries or processes their raw materials in ad-
vanced country locations. The former will face a decline in their returns since protectionism will 
most likely reduce trade flows. The latter will not only lose their foreign markets, but they will now 
have to compete with the new industries in lagging countries for their raw materials. There will of 
course be some compensating gains to the advanced countries from increasing exports of capital 
goods to the lagging countries, but these gains may be no consolation to those sections of manu-
facturing capital engaged in the production of consumer nondurables. Moreover, the greatest 
threat to these industries may emerge in the long run, when they face competition in their home 
markets from low-cost producers in lagging countries. 
Sovereign countries are also likely to raise more taxes than dependent countries, enabling the 
former to provide better infrastructure for the growth of manufacturing. Landed elites in sove-
reign countries will be willing to raise revenues by taxing imports (for reasons explained earlier), 
and taxing the incomes of capital, both domestic and foreign, engaged in trade and manufacturing. 
Dependent countries will be much less willing and able to impose any of these taxes. Instead, they 
will shift the burden of taxes onto their indigenous landed elites. But this burden must remain 
modest in order to avoid the risk of alienating an important ally, thus producing a tendency to-
wards a lower tax base in dependent countries. 
The security concerns of dependent and sovereign lagging countries also pulled them in op-
posite directions on industrial policy. The security of dependent countries was normally guaran-
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teed by the imperialist powers, and they rarely maintained large armies of their own. On the other 
hand, sovereign countries generally took responsibility for their own defense, and maintained large 
armies for this purpose. The nascent manufacturing sectors in these countries derived important 
advantages from their armies. The military's domestic procurements often provided captive mar-
kets for several basic goods, including clothing, shoes, tents, construction materials, light arms and 
ammunition; they had access to roads and railways built for strategic reasons; they could draw 
upon the supply of skilled manpower emanating from military colleges, and maintenance and re-
pair facilities. More importantly, the strong feedbacks between a country's defense and its manu-
facturing base, provided an independent impetus towards industrialization in sovereign countries. 
One should add that the policy bias against manufactures in dependent countries is not an 
iron law. In special cases, colonial powers may encourage economic growth in colonies when it 
serves their security needs. Driven by the urge to catch-up with the industrial leaders, Japan en-
couraged investments in Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, in order to take advantage of their cheap 
labor, power and raw materials. Japan also implemented progressive agricultural policies in these 
colonies, albeit under the colonial aegis, in order to reduce its own dependence on imported food 
from non-colonial sources. In a less spectacular manner, under pressures stemming from the 
Second World War, Britain also modified its colonial policies to accommodate some industrializa-
tion in India. 
The presence in any colony of large numbers of settlers from the metropolitan country can al-
so create conditions favorable to local industrialization. The settlers bring valuable industrial and 
entrepreneurial skills; they constitute a potential market for domestic manufactures; but most im-
portantly, they will be able to exploit their close social ties with colonial governments to extract 
policies supportive of industrialization. It is not surprising, therefore, that those African countries - 
such as Rhodesia and Kenya - which made some progress in industrial development had large 
settler populations.15 
3. Imperialism and Industrial Policies 
Although our aim here is not to be exhaustive, a quick survey of the historical evidence re-
veals that sovereign countries pursued trade, banking and state-procurement policies, starting 
                                                          
15  Kilby (1975:473). 
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at various points during the nineteenth century, which biased incentives in favor of domestic 
manufactures; few of these policies were to be found in the dependent countries over the 
same period. 
In Bairoch's (1993: 41) striking phrase, the dependent countries were "an ocean of libe-
ralism" during the century and a half preceding 1950. A policy of free or nearly-free trade 
was the norm in the colonies until the start of Second World War. Import tariffs were levied 
only for revenue purposes, and these remained very modest and were often accompanied by 
offsetting taxes on domestic production.16 The quasi-colonies were not in a visibly more en-
vious position with regard to tariff autonomy. The open-door policies imposed on them dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century placed severs limits on the tariffs they could im-
pose. The Ottoman realms began the nineteenth century with a 3 percent limit on their im-
port tariffs; this was raised to 8 percent in 1861, and 11 percent in 1907 in order to pay off 
foreign debts.17 Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Aden, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and China 
were placed under similar restraints.18 These quasi-colonies did not begin to gain tariff au-
tonomy until several years after World War I.19 
The sovereign countries during most of this period were, to use Bairoch's (1993: 41) 
phrase, "an ocean of protectionism", with fairly high tariffs in place as early as the first half 
of the nineteenth century. An examination of ad valorem tariffs on imports of British cotton 
manufactures in 1884 shows that these rates were generally higher in sovereign countries 
compared to dependent countries. The highest rates were observed in Argentina (30), Brazil 
(30), Chile (25), Victoria (25), Canada (20), Austria (18), Belgium (15), Holland (15), New 
Zealand (15) and Greece (15), all sovereign countries; the numbers in parentheses are per-
cent tariffs. The lowest rates were observed in India (5), China (5), Guyana (5), Queensland 
(5) and Turkey (7), all of which were colonies or quasi-colonies in 1884. The tariff autonomy 
of sovereign countries during the late nineteenth century is also reflected in the percent of 
total revenues derived from customs duties. Whereas this was a mere 2 percent for India, it 
                                                          
16  See Chaudhuri (1983: 865-866) for such policies in India, Owen (1981: 225) for Egypt, Brett 
(1973: 269-72) for Tanganyika. 
17  Crouchley 1938: 72-73). 
18  Tariff rates for Middle Eastern countries obtained from Issawi (1982: 19-22). For China, see Lewis 
(1978: 200) and Maddison (1985: 34). For Thailand, see Lewis (1978: 200). 
19  Turkey gained its tariff autonomy in 1929; Iran in 1928; Egypt in 1930; and Iraq in 1933. See Issa-
wi (1982:22). 
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was 78 percent in Canada, 77 percent in Australia, 73 percent in Norway, 63 percent in Unit-
ed States, 57 percent in Sweden, and 56 percent in Denmark. The average for 13 European 
countries was 19.5 percent.20 
Although several countries in South America were forced to sign unequal treaties with 
Britain as a quid pro quo for help received in wresting their independence from Spain, this 
did not always prevent their following protectionist policies from an early date.21 In 1826, 
tariffs on the bulk of Peru's imports were set at 30 percent; but coarse woolens, footwear, 
hats and furniture paid as much as 90 percent.22 In 1824, imports into Mexico paid a series 
of duties totaling 51.4 percent of the c.i.f. value of imports. There also existed a ban on the 
entry of 116 articles; in 1843 an additional 180 articles were added to this list.23 Similarly, 
Brazil in 1844 had tariffs of 30 percent on most manufactures including cotton. Over the 
next three years, duties on machinery and raw materials were lifted, thereby increasing the 
protectionist effect of the existing tariffs. By 1885, the average tariffs had risen to 45 percent, 
with the highest rates going up to 100 percent.24 In Chile, customs duties provided roughly 
60 percent of total government revenues between 1835 and 1860, though this proportion 
declined in the next two decades.25 The ratio of tariff revenues to imports in Colombia fluc-
tuated between 16 and 86 percent over 1879-1890, but stabilized at around 50 percent after 
the turn of the century.26 
Tariffs were of course not the only instrument of industrial policy during this period. 
Sovereign countries promoted industries by means of a broad range of instruments in addi-
tion to trade policies. Gerschenkron's (1962) seminal studies on late industrialization in nine-
teenth-century Europe show that government interventions in support of industrialization 
were pervasive in the most backward sovereign economies of Europe. In Russia, for in-
stance, the government set up investment banks, provided direct subsidies to industries, used 
official procurements to create markets for industries, and performed coordinating and en-
                                                          
20  Mulhall (1892:558). 
21  Bairoch (1993:41). 
22  Mathew (1968: 565). 
23  Potash (1983: 19, 21, and 139). 
24  Stein (1957: 10-15 and 84). 
25  Cariola and Sunkel (1985: 137). 
26  McGreevey (1985: 67). 
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trepreneurial functions.27 
Although less well known, a similar set of interventions was enforced by some non-
European countries as early as the first half of nineteenth century. The Mexican government 
began to promote industries shortly after its independence in 1821. An industrial bank, set 
up in 1830, provided machinery on credit and subsidized funds to private entrepreneurs. 
During its twelve-year life span, the bank made a pivotal contribution to the development of 
Mexico's modern textile industry.28 Perhaps the most systematic early effort at state-led indu-
strialization outside of Europe occurred in Egypt from 1810 to 1838; by the end of this pe-
riod, state monopolies had made investments worth $12 million in a broad range of indus-
tries including foundries, textiles, paper, chemicals, shipyards, glassware, and arsenals. At 
their height, these industries employed some 30,000 workers. However, nearly all these in-
dustries failed when Egypt was forced, following its defeat in 1840, to forego all state mono-
polies and disband the army, thereby depriving the state industries of their revenues and de-
mand.29 
After regaining their independence in this century, nearly all dependent countries were 
quick to enact policies to promote their manufactures. Upon acquiring various levels of poli-
cy autonomy during the 1930s, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Iraq lost no time in introducing a 
broad range of measures to support industrialization, including quotas and differentiated 
tariffs to protect their manufactures; greater investments in infrastructure; creating banks to 
finance industrialization; setting up industries (in Turkey and Iran) in the public sector; and 
offering tax relief, reduced railway rates and preference in government purchases to domes-
tic industries. These measures were more vigorously pursued in Turkey and Iran, which en-
joyed greater autonomy, than Egypt and Iraq.30 A similar switch in industrial policies would 
be repeated in nearly all the colonies when they gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
At the other extreme, there is very little evidence that colonial governments had any pol-
icies for promoting industries. In the words of Fieldhouse (1981: 68), "no colonial govern-
ment had a department of industry before 1945. The state almost never actively encouraged 
                                                          
27  See Trebilcock (1981: 205-291) for a study of Russian industrialization in the light of Gerschen-
kron's experience. 
28  Potash (1983: xi, 46-48, 125). 
29  Issawi (1982: 154), Crouchley (1938: 69-71) and Batou (1991). 
30  Issawi (1982: 14, 22) and Jalal (1972: 6, 88-89, and 104-105). 
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indigenous entrepreneurs to invest in local import-substituting industrial production. The 
government did not provide medium or long-term loans to help would-be capitalists, though 
the banking system, owned by banks in the metropolis and geared to the needs of im-
port/export trade, was seldom willing to provide these essential credit facilities to non-
Europeans." One might add, the colonial state rarely used its procurement policies to en-
courage domestic industries. 
4. Cross-Country Evidence 
Theory and historical evidence lead us to expect that loss or erosion of sovereignty would 
lead to market and policy biases against industrialization over the period 1800 to 1950. This 
proposition lends itself to empirical analysis, since the cumulative impact of the dual biases 
can be expected produce lower levels of industrialization in countries with lower levels of 
sovereign control over their policies. 
A search of the literature turned up only one empirical study of this hypothesis. Morris 
and Adelman (1988) examined the relationship between industrialization and sovereignty as 
part of a monumental exercise that employed disjoint principal components analysis to ex-
plore patterns of development in a stratified sample of 23 countries over three time periods, 
1850-1860, 1860-1890 and 1890-1914. Their analysis shows that 'foreign domination of eco-
nomic policies' is one of two most "critical forces explaining differences among the four 
country groups in industrialization patterns".31 Since our theoretical analysis and the asso-
ciated historical evidence assign a determining role to sovereignty in affecting levels of indu-
strialization, we will employ the simpler regression techniques to test for the impact of sove-
reignty on levels of industrialization. 
Our hypothesis on the relationship between sovereignty and levels of industrialization can 
be tested by adding qualitative variables for sovereignty to the framework developed by Che-
nery and Syrquin (1975) for studying patterns of development.32 The augmented Chenery-
                                                          
31  Morris and Adelman (1988: 122). The four country groups are defined in terms of the following 
criteria: 'substantial early industrialization through autonomous market system growth'; 'later sub-
stantial industrialization promoted by national governments'; 'late modest industrial growth follow-
ing primary export expansion in countries where land is fairly abundant'; and 'negligible industriali-
zation in export-oriented, densely settled peasant economies'. 
32  It may be objected that countries which failed to industrialize were ripe targets for colonization, 
and hence it is likely that their colonial status is a proxy for factors which were inimical to indu-
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Syrquin framework may be set out as follows: 
 
IND =   α + βU + γV + ε [1] 
 
where IND is an index of industrialization, U is a vector of variables relating to imperialist 
control, V is a vector of economic determinants of IND, and K is the error term. Industria-
lization is defined as the ratio (YMFG) of manufacturing output to GDP.33 Mining is ex-
cluded from the industrial sector because its relative size depends upon the accidents of nat-
ural endowments and the element of rent in the value of its output. 
The concept of imperialist control is operationalized in terms of a six-fold taxonomy 
based on the degree and duration of imperialist control over the period 1860 to 1960. 
SOV=1 for all countries that were independent in, or before 1921, and enjoyed sovereign 
status following independence; DEP=1 for all countries that were independent in, or before 
1921, and were dependencies over most of the period following independence; QC=1 for 
countries that were colonies and (or) quasi-colonies over most of the period 1860to 1940; 
NIC2=1 for newly independent countries which gained their independence between 1940 
and 1950; and NIC 1=1 for newly independent countries which gained their independence 
between 1950 and 1960. The base category for this set of imperialist dummies consists of 
countries that were colonies in 1960. These categories have been defined to reflect increasing 
                                                                                                                                                              
strialization. There are two responses to this objection. One might point out that, outside of some 
countries in Western Europe, United States, and, perhaps, Canada, industrialization had made little 
headway at the time that the process of colonization was already nearly complete (during the 
1870s). At another level, a little reflection quickly reveals that a country's chances of being colo-
nized—or avoiding this fate – during the nineteenth century, hinged on several plausible factors: 
size of the country, proximity to advanced countries, whether it was landlocked or an island, 
whether it had riverine access, whether it had tropical or temperate climate,  the vector of diseases 
and the state of medical technology, density of population, internal divisiveness due to religious 
differences, imperialist rivalries, balance of power, alliances with major powers, strategic impor-
tance to major powers, etc. A mere listing of these factors should help to dispel any simplistic cor-
relations between a country's sovereign status and its initial level of industrialization. 
33  Alternatively, we might define IND in terms of the sectoral share of manufacturing (LMFG) in a 
country's total labor force. However, our empirical analysis does not focus on this definition for 
two reasons. Sectoral attribution of labor force is difficult conceptually when the same laborers 
engage in multiple activities, a phenomenon quite common in developing countries. Secondly, the 
use of LMFG greatly reduces our sample of observations from 84 to 64; the reduced sample leaves 
us with very few observations to estimate some of our imperialist dummies. Regressions with 
LMFG as the dependent variable were nevertheless estimated, and the results are discussed at the 
end of this section. 
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imperialist control as we move from sovereign countries to the colonies. 
Various combinations of these imperialist dummies will also be used in the estimations. 
On the assumption that differences in degrees of imperialist control between colonies and 
quasi-colonies were not substantial, or that a decade or two of industrial policies following 
independence may not be sufficient to offset the adverse economic impact of imperialist 
policies going back several decades, it would be more appropriate to test the imperialist the-
sis in terms of a three-fold taxonomy consisting of sovereign countries, dependencies, and all 
other countries that were colonies or quasi-colonies during most of the period from 1860 to 
1960. Alternatively, since distinctions between sovereign countries and dependencies might 
be considered controversial, we constructed a two-fold taxonomy consisting of two catego-
ries: SOV-DEP=1 for all sovereign countries and dependencies, and SOV-DEP=0 for all 
other countries. An even stronger version of this logic would lump dependencies with the 
colonies and quasi-colonies, giving us two categories: sovereign countries and all dependent 
countries. 
To define the set of economic determinants of industrialization, we first turn to Chenery 
and Syrquin (1975). Their investigation of patterns of development, across countries and 
over time, showed that per capita income (Y), population (POP), and the squares of these 
terms explained most of the variations in sectoral output shares. These results were sup-
ported by appeals to Engel's law and the presence of scale economies in manufacturing. In 
addition, we introduce a new variable, population density (DEN)—defined as hectares of 
arable land per person—to serve as a proxy for resource availability; this is a rough proxy 
since it does not account for differences in land quality or the presence of minerals. The in-
corporation of DEN obviated the need to split the sample, as Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
do, into primary-oriented and industry-oriented countries. 
The choice of an appropriate year for testing our hypotheses on imperialism is impor-
tant. Ideally, the impact of imperialism on industrialization should be examined at some 
point during the decade of the 1940s. Beyond this period, differences between colonies and 
independent countries tend to diminish as imperialist powers come under increasing pres-
sure to accommodate the interests of indigenous labor and capital in the colonies.34 But na-
                                                          
34  The growing movements for national liberation in the colonies, the Second World War, and the 
logic of the Cold War all forced colonial powers beginning in the late 1940s to give greater weight 
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tional income accounts for several countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, do not 
begin until 1960. This was also a watershed year in the history of decolonization since most 
African countries gained their independence in 1960. As a result, it was decided to test our 
hypothesis for 1960 when data on a sufficiently large and diverse sample of countries first 
become available. 
Data sources for all the variables pertaining to 1960 are easily identified. Data on YMFG 
and LMFG (defined as percentage share of manufacturing labor in total labor force) were 
obtained respectively from World Bank (1960) and Bairoch (1968). Data on per capita in-
come (converted into a common set of 1985 prices) and POP were obtained from Summers 
et al (1993). Summers et al (1993) do not present break¬downs of GDP by industries. As a 
result, we were forced to rely on YMFG in domestic prices which are subject to distortions 
arising from trade policies. Population density, DEN, is calculated as hectares of arable land 
per person. Measures of arable land (including land under permanent crops and land tempo-
rarily fallow), in hectares, were found in Food and Agricultural Organization (1961, 1963 and 
1966). These values are for years nearest to 1960 for which data were available. In most cas-
es, they lie within a band of three years around 1960. Dates of independence for countries in 
our sample were taken from Taylor and Hudson (1972: 26-29). 
The overall results of regressions on YMFG reported in tables 1 and 2 are quickly re-
viewed. Since the inclusion of DEN significantly reduces our sample size from 84 to 71, it 
was decided to present the results first without this variable and then with this variable; the 
list of countries in the two samples are given in appendices Al and A2 respectively. An ex-
amination of the Rr s , ranging from 0.72 to 0.73 in table 1 and 0.75 to 0.80 in table 2, reveal 
a fairly high degree of explanatory power for these cross-country regressions. The F-statistics 
too are highly significant increasing our confidence in the parameter estimates. It may be 
noted that the results on /-statistics reported in the tables have been corrected using White's 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators. 
The results in table 1 generally provide strong confirmation of our hypothesis regarding 
the adverse impact of imperialism on industrialization. Four of the five imperialist dummies, 
SOV, DEP, NIC2 and NIC1 have positive coefficients with all but the first being significant 
                                                                                                                                                              
to the needs of the colonies than they had done in previous periods. See Alarn (1994: 244-47). 
  
 
16 
Table One 
Regressions Explaining Variations in YMFG across Countries In 1960 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.42 1.94+ 1.60 2.25* 
 (1.28) (1.80) (1.19) (2.06) 
Y 0.70E-2** 0.73E-2** 0.75E-2** 0.74E-2** 
 (7.10) (7.23) (7.04) (7.47) 
Y2 -0.62E-6** -0.66E-6** -0.68E-6** -0.68E-6** 
 (6.03) (6.52) (5.38) (6.67) 
POP 0.09** 0.11** 0.12** 0.10** 
 (3.05) (4.03) (3.70) (3.76) 
POP2 -0.19E-3** -0.21E-3** -0.23E-3** -0.20E-3** 
 (2.77) (3.40) (2.93) (3.17) 
NIC1 2.08    
 (0.98)    
NIC2 4.43**    
 (2.59)    
QC -0.04    
 (0.01)    
DEP 4.42** 3.58**   
 (3.40) (2.87)   
SOV 7.03** 5.86**  5.36** 
 (3.67) (3.25)  (3.07) 
SOV-DEP   5.12**  
   (3.60)  
R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 
F 26.5** 38.0** .. .** 45.4 44.0** 
N 84 84 84 84 
(**), (*), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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at the 1 percent level. This means that if YMFG in a colony was 8.7 per cent in 1960 (the 
mean value of YMFGs in all colonies in the same year), the corresponding values of YMFG 
in a sovereign, dependent, or newly industrializing country (NIC2) with identical economic 
characteristics were 15.60, 12. 96, 12.97, and 10.65 per cent respectively. Although, NIC1 
appears with a positive coefficient, this is not significant at the 10 percent level. Perhaps be-
cause these countries gained their independence in the 1950s, some of them had little time to 
implement a program of industrialization by 1960. The negative coefficient on QC is of no 
particular significance, its coefficient and associated r-value being very small. The failure of 
QC to appear with a positive sign might also perhaps be explained in terms of two factors. 
Of the five quasi-colonies in our sample (Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Thailand and Turkey), two are 
oil-rich; when we introduced a dummy for oil-rich countries in the first regression, this gave 
us a positive, though still insignificant, coefficient for QC. Further, all five quasi-colonies had 
a history of monarchic forms of government, suggesting that this, rather than their status as 
quasi-colonies, might account for their lag in industrialization. It has been argued that abso-
lutist monarchies are inimical to education and economic development.35 
The other variants of our hypothesis on imperialism receive even stronger confirmation. 
DEP and SOV in column 2 of table 1 have positive coefficients that are significant at the 1 
percent level. The results imply that if YMFG in a dependent country (defined to include 
QCs, NIC2s, NIC Is and colonies) was 10.4 percent in 1960 (the mean value of YMFG for 
all dependent countries in the same year), the values of YMFG for dependencies and sove-
reign countries in 1960, similar in their economic characteristics to the dependent country, 
were 14.0 and 16.3 percent respectively. We get similar results, reported in column 3, when 
sovereign countries and dependencies are subsumed into one category. The results in col-
umn 4 of table 1 show that the strongest version of our hypothesis on imperialism also 
passes muster: the coefficient of SOV is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The anti-industry bias in the output structure of dependent countries was quite strong 
even in 1960. Compared to a dependent country with YMFG equal to 10.8 per cent (the 
mean value of YMFG for all dependent countries), industrialization in a sovereign country, 
ceteris paribus, was 50 percent higher, with YMFG equal to 16.2 percent. 
  
                                                          
35  Some evidence on this thesis may be found in Easterlin (1981). 
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Table Two 
Regressions Explaining Variations in MFG across Countries In 1960 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.39 1.64 1.28 2.12* 
 (0.38) (1.52) (1.34) (1.92) 
Y 0.72E-2** 0.71E-2** 0.73E-2** 0.73E-2** 
 (7.65) (6.79) (7.87) (7.07) 
Y2 -0.65E-6** -0.64E-6** -0.67E-6** -0.67E-6** 
 (7.27) (6.34) (6.91) (6.57) 
POP 0.13** 0.13** 0.14** 0.12** 
 (5.29) (5.04) (5.80) (4.68) 
POP2 -0.28E-3** -0.26E-3** -0.28E-3** -0.25E-3** 
 (5.09) (4.31) (4.96) (4.03) 
DEN 0.43E-1** 0.40E-1** 0.40E-1** 0.35E-1** 
 (4.37) (3.72) (3.69) (3.20) 
NIC1 3.94+    
 (1.77)    
NIC2 6.22**    
 (3.98)    
QC -2.79    
 (1.10)    
DEP 5.12** 3.98**   
 (4.18) (3.17)   
SOV 7.10** 6.08**  5.36** 
 (3.55) (3.02)  (2.76) 
SOV-DEP   5.33**  
   (3.49)  
R2 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.75 
F 28.6 33.2 38.7 36.7 
N 71 71 71 71 
( * *), (*), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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The results in table 2 show that the addition of DEN to our regressions, while reducing 
the sample size from 84 to 71, did not significantly alter our previous results. DEN appears 
with the expected positive sign and is moreover statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
in every regression. The inclusion of DEN has also significantly raised the values of R2s. NIC1 
is now statistically significant at the 10 percent level; previously it was not significant at this 
level. It may be noted that the values of the coefficients of SOV and SOV-DEP in the regres-
sions remain virtually unchanged, giving some indication of the robustness of these results. 
The sample of countries in the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2 includes both lagging 
and advanced countries. It might be argued that our tests should be applied only to the sample 
of lagging countries over the century ending in the 1950s. To examine if our results are sensi-
tive to the inclusion of advanced countries, the regressions in tables 1 and 2 were estimated 
after excluding 14 advanced countries.36 The new regressions had somewhat smaller R2s, but 
all the previous results with respect to the imperialist dummies remained unchanged. 
There are two countries in our sample of colonies, Hong Kong and Singapore, which do 
not quite belong there. Since these economies do not have an agricultural hinterland, the rela-
tive size of manufacturing in total output gets inflated, making their comparison with other 
countries problematic. This was confirmed when we re-estimated the regressions in tables 1 
and 2 without these countries. The values of the coefficients on the imperialist dummies as 
well as their t-values were now significantly higher. 
When we excluded from our sample countries with populations of less than 1 million and, 
later, countries with populations less than 2 million, all the results in tables 1 and 2 with respect 
to the imperialist dummies remained unchanged in their essentials. Similar results were also 
reported when we re-estimated the regressions with the logs of Y, POP and their square terms. 
Alternatively, since the dependent variable in our regressions has a lower bound at 0 and an 
upper bound at 100, the regressions were re-estimated using the logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable. This left nearly all our results unchanged; only NIC1 now appeared with a 
negative sign not significant at the 10 percent level. 
Given the importance of Y in our regressions – Y and Y2 alone explain 63 percent of the 
variation in YMFG – it was decided to explore how the results in tables 1 and 2 would be af-
                                                          
36  The advanced countries excluded from our sample are: Canada, US, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, W. Germany, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK 
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fected if we used an earlier data set on Y from Summers and Heston (1991) instead of Sum-
mers et al (1993). These data sets give widely different estimates of Y for several countries, the 
result primarily of an expansion in the number of benchmark countries for the 1993 data set. 
However, given the wide range in the values of Y across countries, the overall correlation coef-
ficient between the two data sets remains very high at 0.98 for our sample of countries. When 
our regressions were re-estimated using the 1991 data, the results on the imperialist dummies 
were stronger than before. 
A more systematic check on the sensitivity of our results was also undertaken following 
Levine and Renelt's (1992) adaptation of Learner's extreme bounds analysis. The independent 
variables are disaggregated into three subsets, as shown below: 
YMFG= α +   β iI +   βmM +   βzZ + μ                                       [2]  
 
where I is a vector of always-included variables; M is the vector of imperialist dummies whose 
robustness is being explored; and Z is the subset of other explanatory variables. The I-variables 
for the regressions in table 1 are Y, Y2, POP and POP2; DEN is added to these I-variables for 
the regressions in table 2. What are the Z-variables? All other things remaining the same, lan-
dlocked countries (LAND = 1 for landlocked countries) are expected to have a larger manu-
facturing sector because of the greater natural protection they enjoy from imports. On the oth-
er hand, manufacturing activities will lag behind Y in oil-rich countries (OIL=1 for oil-rich 
countries), where this sector has not had sufficient time to catch-up with the oil-induced in-
creases in Y. Finally, since all but seven of the colonies in our sample are in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, it may be argued that the lower values of YMFG in the colonies may be due to factors 
which are specific to Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is quite easy to introduce a third dummy 
variable (AFR = 1 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) to check for the presence of such an 
effect, this creates a multicollinearity problem as well as some problems of interpretation which 
will be discussed later. 
Having identified the Z-variables, the regressions in table 1 were re-estimated after includ-
ing all possible linear combinations of LAND, OIL, and AFR. The base values (taken from the 
regressions in table 1) and the upper and lower bounds of the coefficients of NIC2, DEP, 
SOV, and SOV-DEP are reported in table 3; the results for NIC1 and QC were not reported 
because their base values were not statistically significant. The results show that SOV is robust 
at the 1 percent level in the first regression; SOV is also robust in the second and fourth re-
gressions at the 5 percent level; and SOV-DEP is robust at the 5 percent level in the third   
  
 
21 
Table Three 
Sensitivity Results on Regressions in Table 1 
Dep. Var. M-Vars.  t Other Vars           R/F 
YMFG NIC2             High 6.69  3.10** LAND               F 
(Eqn. 1) Base 4.43 2.59**  
 Low 3.89 1.45 OIL, AFR 
YMFG DEP              High 5.65  2.60** LAND               F 
(Eqn. 1) Base 4.42 3.40**  
 Low 2.70 0.99 OIL, AFR 
YMFG SOV             High 7.26  3.84** LAND               R 
(Eqn. 1) Base 7.03 3.67**  
 Low 5.23 2.64** OIL, AFR 
YMFG DEP              High 4.24  2.11** Land                 F 
(Eqn. 2) Base 3.58 2.87**  
 Low 1.09 0.77 OIL, AFR 
YMFG SOV              High 6.07 3.00** LAND               R 
(Eqn. 2) Base 5.86 3.25**  
 Low 3.85 2.08* LAND,AFR 
YMFG SOV             High 5.45  3.17** AFR                 R 
(Eqn. 3) Base 5.36 3.07**  
 Low 3.57 2.07* AFR, OIL, 
    Land 
YMFG SOV-DEP      High 5.07  3.58** LAND               R 
(Eqn. 4) Base 5.12 3.60**  
 Low 2.89 2.11* AFR 
(**), (*), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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Table Four 
Sensitivity Results on Regressions in Table 2 
 
Dep. Var.     M-Var.   t Other                          R/F 
    Vars. 
YMFG         NIC2 High 6.69 4.04** LAND                       R 
(Eqn. 1) Base 6.22 3.98**  
 Low 3.89 1.92* OIL, AFR 
YMFG         DEP High 5.66  4.08** LAND                       F 
(Eqn. 1) Base 5.12 4.18**  
 Low 2.70 1.47 OIL, AFR 
YMFG         SOV High 7.26   3.71** LAND                       R 
(Eqn. 1) Base 7.10 3.55**  
 Low 5.23 2.65** OIL, AFR 
YMFG         DEP High 4.02  3.03** LAND                       F 
(Eqn. 2) Base 3.98 3.17**  
 Low 1.09 0.77 OIL, AFR 
YMFG        SOV High 6.07 3.00** LAND                       R 
(Eqn. 2) Base 6.08 3.02**  
 Low 3.93 2.12* OIL, AFR 
YMFG        SOV High 5.53 2.35* AFR                         R 
(Eqn. 3) Base 5.36 2.76**  
 Low 3.44 1.83+ OIL 
YMFG         SOV-DEP High 5.35 3.50** LAND                       R 
(Eqn. 4) Base 5.33 3.49**  
 Low 2.89 2.09* LAND,OIL,AFR 
(**), (*), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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regression. Similar results are reported in table 4 for the imperialist dummies in table 2 with 
one difference: NIC2 is now robust at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that differenc-
es in levels of industrialization between the colonies and any one of the other dependent coun-
tries are not robust. On the other hand, the sensitivity analysis provides confirmation for our 
imperialist thesis in the two stronger versions: controlling for all other factors, levels of indu-
strialization in the sovereign countries are higher than in any of several groups of dependent 
countries; and, mat levels of industrialization in the sovereign countries find dependencies as a 
group are higher than in the remaining dependent countries. 
The inclusion of AFR in the sensitivity analysis calls for some comments. AFR always 
takes a negative sign in the regressions that is often significant at the 10 percent or higher le-
vels. It is not clear a priori whether this negative effect on industrialization is due to the pres-
ence of some factors specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, or whether the interaction of colonialism 
with these Afro-centric factors produces this result. Fortunately, some simple tests can be de-
vised to throw light on this question. If industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa before 1960 had 
been retarded by Afro-centric factors alone, then these factors would continue to retard indu-
strialization in these countries long after 1960. Accordingly, two new variables were defined: 
RYMFG = (YMFG-1970)/(YMFG-1960) and RY= (Y-1970)/(Y-1960). Data on YMFG-1970 
and Y-1970 were obtained from World Bank (1993) and Summers et al. (1993) respectively. 
We then regressed RYMFG on AFR and various combinations of YMFG-60, Y-1960 and RY. 
The results, reported in table 5, show that AFR always appears with a positive coefficient that 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent or better levels: the t-statistics were corrected using 
White's heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. This suggests that countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa increased their YMFGs more rapidly during the 1960s than all the other countries, sug-
gesting that the earlier industrial lag in these countries could not have been due to Afro-centric 
factors alone. If this result is to be taken seriously, the inclusion of AFR in the sensitivity analy-
sis is not warranted. Correspondingly, both NIC2 and DEP would pass the test of robustness. 
It should also be noted that there is high multicollinearity between the imperialist dummies and 
AFR. The correlation coefficient between AFR and the sum of all the imperialist dummies is 
0.78 for the sample in table 1, and 0.72 for the sample in table 2. This may explain why the t-
values for the imperialist dummies in the first column of tables 1 and 2 (especially NIC2 and 
DEP) decline when these regressions are re-estimated with AFR. 
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Table Five  
Regressions Explaining Advances in Industrialization: 1960-1970 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.59** 1.22** 1.61** 1.84*^" 
 (12.87) (30.44) (12.03) (5.09) 
Y-1960  -0.38E-4** 0.47E-4 0.41E-4 
  (4.67) (1.62) (1.46) 
YMFG-1960 -0.02**  -0.03** -0.03** 
 (3.99)  (3.18) (2.48) 
RY    -0.17** 
    (2.98) 
AFR 0.35** 0.56** 0.36** 0.33** 
 (2.14) (2.77) (2.02) (2.07) 
R2 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.33 
F 16.2** 11.1** 11.2** 8.5** 
N 63 63 63 63 
( ** ), (* ), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively  
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Table Six 
Regressions Explaining Variations In LMFG Across Countries In 1960 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.41 2.15 1.71 
 (0.75 (1.25) (0.92) 
Y 0.58E-2** 0.65E-2** 0.57E-2** 
 (4.23) (5.82) (4.20) 
Y2 -0.31E-6* -0.35E-6** -0.31E-6* 
 (2.18) (2.64) (2.17) 
POP -0.18E-2 -0.49 -0.31E-6 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) 
POP2 0.23E-4 0.11E-5 0.26E-4 
 (0.37) (0.02) (0.42) 
DEP 0.89   
 (0.72)   
SOV 3.45*  3.29* 
 (1.97)  (1.95) 
SOV-DEP  0.15E-2  
  (1.43)  
R2 0.80 0.79 0.80 
F ., _** 41.3 46.9** 50.2** 
N 62 62 62 
(**), (*), and (+) represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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Should we not also test our hypothesis on imperialism with LMFG as the dependent variable 
to confirm our results? There are several practical difficulties to doing this. It was pointed out 
earlier that the quality of data on employment is not as reliable as the national accounts data. 
But there are more serious constraints arising from data availability. The use of LMFG as the 
dependent variable reduces our sample size from 84 to 64; a list of the sample countries is pro-
vided in appendix A3. A greater difficulty arises from the type of colonies in this sample: of the 
11 colonies in our sample, 8 have populations of less than 1 million and 6 are small island 
economies. Clearly, this is not a representative sample of the colonies, thus placing in doubt 
the utility of any analysis with such a biased sample. 
With these caveats in mind, we nevertheless re-ran the regressions in tables 1 and 2 with 
LMFG as the dependent variable. The initial results from these regressions, reported in table 6, 
were not generally supportive of the hypothesis on imperialism; most of the imperialist control 
dummies were statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. But this was mostly due to the 
presence of two clear outliers: Venezuela and Hong Kong. Once these outliers were eliminated 
from our sample, the results on the imperialist dummies were similar to those reported earlier. 
Since there were only two observations each for NIC1 and QC, clearly an insufficient basis for 
making statistical inferences, we have only reported regressions with three sets of imperialist 
control dummies in table 6. These results in columns 1 and 2 show that SOV has a positive 
coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level; the coefficients for DEP in col-
umn 1 and SOV-DEP in column 2 are positive but not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. Although these results are not reported, the inclusion of DEN in these regressions leaves 
the results on SOV and DEP unchanged, while SOV-DEP is now statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. The sensitivity of these results was also checked by incorporating AFR; these 
exercises were not extended to OIL and LAND because there were only 2 observations on 
OIL and 3 observations on LAND. The inclusion of AFR in the regressions made SOV statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level, both with and without DEN. SOV-DEP is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level without DEN, at the 5 percent level with DEN included. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented theory and evidence to show that imperialism was a major factor 
impeding the spread of the industrial revolution during the century ending in the 1950s. The 
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supporting evidence is of two kinds. First, the historical evidence presented in section three 
shows that sovereign countries were promoting manufactures during most of the century and a 
half ending in the 1950s, while policies in dependent countries were biased in the opposite di-
rection. Second, the regression analysis shows that the shares of manufactures in dependent 
countries were significantly lower than in sovereign countries with comparable economic cha-
racteristics. Moreover, these results are shown to be robust to changes in sample size, func-
tional forms, and specifications of the estimating equations. In particular, our basic results are 
not affected by the introduction of a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Apart from providing empirical content to frequent nationalist claims that imperialism 
sought to set back industrialization in lagging countries, the main result of this paper is not 
without some relevance to contemporary debates about appropriate economic policies in lag-
ging countries. The period 1860 to 1960 provides a rather large number of pure cases of econ-
omies which got their prices "right", and others which got their prices "wrong". The depen-
dent countries accepted border prices, gave free access to foreign capital, had low government 
expenditures, eschewed subsidies to manufactures, balanced their budgets, and placed severe 
limits on public enterprises in the financial and manufacturing sectors. It is the sovereign coun-
tries which often resorted to heterodox economic policies during this period: they liberally em-
ployed protective tariffs, set up manufactures in the public sector, created protected markets 
(when they could) for their manufactures in their dependencies, often failed to balance their 
budgets, experienced a rising share of government expenditures in GDP, maintained overva-
lued currencies, and, sometimes, reneged on their international obligations in times of pay-
ments crises. This paper has shown that these distortionary policies produced a significantly 
larger manufacturing sector in the sovereign countries compared to countries which were rela-
tively free from policy-induced distortions. 
Yet it is the sovereign countries, free to pursue distortionary policies, whose growth per-
formance was incomparably superior to that of the dependent countries over the period from 
1860 to 1960. It may be worth recalling that this superior economic performance in the sove-
reign countries was accomplished despite two great wars in which many of them participated 
directly, suffering enormous war damages, while most dependencies were spared direct in-
volvement in these wars and the accompanying losses to physical and human capital. How 
then did the sovereign countries, with the double handicaps of distortionary policies and war-
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damages to their economies, nevertheless, continue to pull ahead of the dependencies? Certain-
ly, an objective answer to this question would lead to a more balanced appraisal of the kinds of 
economic policies that lead to more rapid growth. 
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Appendix Al  
Country Sample in Table 1 Regressions 
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Appendix A2 Country Sample in Table 2 Regressions 
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Appendix A3  
Country Sample in Table 6 Regressions 
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